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1. Introduction 
 
Economists distinguish between two kinds of Political Business Cycle (PBC). 
Opportunistic PBCs are generated by politicians manipulating the business cycle to get 
themselves re-elected (Nordhaus, 1975).  Partisan PBCs result from systematic 
differences between left- and right-wing governments (Alesina, 1987), and wage 
contracts that overlap elections.  Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997) find no evidence for 
opportunistic PBCs.  The hypothesis also implies irrational behaviour unless voters are 
badly informed about the competence of politicians (Rogoff and Sibert, 1988).  However, 
the evidence for rational partisan cycles when applied to a panel of OECD countries was 
more promising, if never resounding (Alesina, Roubini and Cohen, 1997). 
 
According to the ‘rational partisan’ theory, the economy is affected not just by the timing 
of elections, but also by the electors’ anticipation of the result.  Thus a group of workers 
may negotiate a year-long wage deal knowing that it will straddle an election, and the 
contending parties have 2% and 10% monetary growth in mind respectively.  Rational 
workers will go for an intermediate pay rise.  Hence, if the more anti-inflationary of the 
two parties gets in, a rise in unemployment ensues; if the “wetter” alternative wins, it 
starts its term with a minor boom. 
 
But what the workers go for will depend on who they expect to win.  If, for example, they 
felt certain that an incumbent government was going to be re-elected, they would behave 
exactly as if there were to be no election, and the election itself (assuming the government 
did get back) would have no effect on output.  In general, the more likely a party seems to 
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get in, the closer workers will pitch their pay claims to matching its expected monetary 
policy.  Post-electoral shocks to output will thus be largest when the election result was 
least expected. 
 
Similarly, pre-electoral fluctuations will occur given that wage-setters anticipate electoral 
changes at some time during their wage contract (Cohen, 1993).  The fluctuation 
increases with the likelihood of a change of regime.  For instance if the incumbent right-
wing party were expected to lose an impending election, there would be a pre-electoral 
recession as real wages increased.  The stronger the expectation, the bigger the wage rise 
and the bigger the recession. 
 
Most research so far has ignored the question of the degree of ex ante uncertainty 
associated with the elections, e.g. Paldam (1991), Alesina and Roubini (1992, 1997) and 
Hadri, Lockwood and Maloney (1998).  An exception is Carlsen and Pedersen (1999), 
who estimate three series of election result probabilities for seven countries over mixed 
time horizons, all of which require time series of opinion poll data.  We extend this work 
in a number of important directions.  Firstly, the estimable equation is formally derived 
from the incumbent government’s loss-minimisation problem.  Secondly, because we 
estimate probabilities for circumstances where opinion poll data are not available, 13 
additional countries are analysed and our analysis covers a longer sample period.  Third, 
our theoretically derived output equation is shown to depend on two political variables – 
the identity of the incumbent, and a measure of the expectation of the election result, 
whereas Carlsen and Pedersen utilise a single composite term.   
 
 4
Our main aim, however, is to test the hypothesis that Central Bank Independence (CBI) 
reduces RPBC induced volatility.  Indeed the purpose of the innovations described above 
is to take a comprehensive and accurate look at this issue.  Using the recently developed 
data set of Kilponen, Mayes and Vilmonen (2000) we also identify if and how successful 
different ‘types’ of independent central banks are at reducing politically induced 
macroeconomic volatility. 
 
In section 2 the dynamic rational partisan model is developed, culminating in an 
estimable output equation incorporating both economic and political variables.  In section 
3 we explain how we estimate the electoral probability series.  In section 4 we test the 
model.  In section 5 we test the hypothesis that central bank independence reduces the 
effects of political variables on output.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The Model 
 
The government dislikes deviation in inflation (πs) from its own (partisan) preferred 
inflation rate (πi), and deviation in output from the natural rate (ys).  This can be 
characterised within a standard loss function, 
( ) 22 5050 sisis y.ππα. +−=L               (1) 
for i = L,R depending on the identity of the incumbent and a time subscript s.  The 
government faces a dynamic supply function, 
( ) ttttt zWyy +−+= − ˆ1 πθρ ,              (2) 
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where 0 < ρ < 1, zt is a supply shock with expected value zero, and tWˆ  is average 
nominal wage growth at time t.  At time t the government therefore wants an inflation rate 
to minimise 
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This first-order condition gives us the current inflation rate as a function of current and 
expected future deviations of output from the natural rate.  Identifying the condition by 
which the government expects to set the inflation rate next period1 eliminates the third 
term of equation (5).  Looking ahead to period t+1, the government knows it will face a 
discounted loss function: 
                                                 
1 Note that the government does not commit itself to future inflation rates.  The condition derived is simply 
that which would minimise expected future discounted losses based on current information.  The 
government is thus choosing the current inflation rate in the light of, and simultaneously with, identification 
of the inflation rates it expects itself to choose in the future, if still in power.  (We assume that parties care 
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Rearranging, multiplying both sides by ρδ and taking expectations gives 
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and substitution of (6) into (5) gives 
( ) ( ) 01 =−−+− + itttit Ey ππδραθππα .            (7) 
We assume that expectations of inflation are formed rationally, i.e. πt+1 = E[πt+1] + νt+1 
where νt+1 is a random error with expectation zero.  Solving (7) for inflation gives  
( ) tittt yv α
θ
πδρδρδρππ −−+−= ++ 111 ,            (8) 
which is substituted into aggregate supply (2), 
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and then solved for yt to give 
( )[ ]1112 1ˆ ++− −++−+−+= tttittt vzWyy θδρθδρππδρθθρθα α .         (9) 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
equally about economic outcomes whether in office or not, and do not adjust policies in the light of what 
they think successors might do.) 
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It remains to explain how wage inflation is determined.  Given electoral uncertainty, 
wage inflation lies between the “bliss” inflation rates of the two parties.  A wage contract 
signed at any point in time depends on the identity of the government through the lifetime 
of that contract.  As in Carlsen and Pedersen (1999, equation 4) in any given quarter, the 
wage inflation rate (Wt) is set at 
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where Lt is a dummy variable set equal to unity for a left-wing incumbent, j is the 
(unknown) quarter in which the election takes place, LtjP  (
R
tjP ) is the probability formed 
in period t of a left (right) wing victory in that quarter  and δp is the private sector 
discount rate.  Given a uniform distribution of contracts then at any point in time average 
wage inflation can be defined as 
( ) LtRtt MMW ππ +−= 1ˆ             (11) 
which is analogous to equation (11) in Alesina (1987).  Average wage inflation is a 
weighted average of the preferred inflation rates of Left and Right governments.  In a 
world of uncertainty concerning the timing and outcome of elections the weight depends 
on what sort of government was expected to predominate when existing wage contracts 
were signed, the measure being 
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Mt, which can take any value between 0 and 1, might be described (inelegantly) as the 
“discounted average leftness” of the regimes expected during the combined lives of all 
extant wage contracts, as seen at the time each contract was signed.  Clearly the equation 
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simplifies in cases where the election date is known with certainty.  For a full derivation 
of the private sector’s wage expectations, see Maloney, Pickering and Hadri (2001). 
 
Putting (11) into (9) gives us an equation of which the reduced form is 
tttttt uMbLbbybby +++++= +− 4312110 π           (13) 
where ut is a composite error term.  The reduced form parameters are defined as follows: 
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We define the long run equilibrium level of yt as that level which occurs when Lt = Mt, so 
that there is and has been no electoral uncertainty throughout the lifetime of every wage 
contract currently running.  The long run equilibrium level of yt is 0 regardless of who is 
in power.  When Lt ≠ Mt then according to the model there is politically induced 
economic volatility.  Tests of the rational political business cycle model under electoral 
uncertainty can be performed through estimation of the reduced form parameters b3 and 
b4.  These are expected to be positive and negative respectively, wherein b4 is conjectured 
to be larger in absolute magnitude than b3.  Equation (13) is under-identified, with 5 
reduced form parameters and 6 structural form parameters.  However, it is possible to 
obtain a measure for πR and πL using 
2
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3. Computation of Election Win Probabilities 
 
Construction of the Mt variable requires three ingredients.  Firstly, following Alesina and 
Roubini (1992) we posit alternative values of the wage contract length, N of 4, 6 and 8 
quarters2.  Secondly, the private sector discount rate, δp is set at 0.99 following Carlsen 
and Pedersen (1999) (CP).  Finally, Mt requires a means of calculating prior election 
probabilities for all the t-N+1 quarters for which period t lies within the wage contract.  
CP describe three alternative measures of election result probabilities.  We have extended 
their work to include 20 countries with varying political frameworks and derive 
probabilities even where there are no opinion poll data, so that a full series for all 
countries from 1960 onwards is estimated.  In this section we concisely describe the 
methodology for computing these three probability measures.  For a more detailed 
discussion see Maloney and Pickering (2000a). 
 
3.1 Political Issues  
 
The first issue is whom to classify as left or right.  Castles and Mair (1984), Huber and 
Inglehart (1995), the World Values Survey and Eurobarometer all provide numerical 
scores for political parties on a left/right continuum from 1 to 10.  Alesina and Roubini 
(1997) define actual governments along similar lines as do Hadri, Lockwood and 
Maloney (1998).  We follow the latter for our definitions, and then combine them with 
our measures of election result probabilities to make probability estimates of whether 
                                                 
2 Bruno and Sachs (1985) demonstrate that these lengths cover the majority of contracts in the countries we 
are studying. 
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there will be a left wing or right-wing government.  In some cases this is straightforward.  
In others, assumptions have to be made about who is most likely to coalesce with who in 
the event of no party getting an absolute majority.  We explain in more detail in the 
appendix, but in all 20 cases we take the probability of a right (left) government as the 
probability that the right-wing parties will win more (fewer) seats than the left-wing ones. 
 
3.2 Computation of Electoral Probabilities 
 
We compare three methods.  Type A is the regression based probability series suggested 
by Chappell and Keech (1988) (CK) for cases where the date of the election, T, is 
assumed to be known.  Where opinion poll data exists we follow Carlsen and Pedersen 
and regress the incumbent seat shares in our sequence of elections against recent 
historical opinion polls and macroeconomic data3.  This gives us predictions of the seats 
each party would have picked up in each quarter had there been a general election then 
( κ−TSˆ ).  We then use the best predicting regression, on the basis of highest R
2, for each 
pre-electoral quarter to compute the probability, estimated from the standpoint of that 
particular quarter, of the incumbent party or coalition getting more than half the seats at 
the forthcoming actual election.  If we denote this as ATP κ− , then:  








−
=
−
−
κ
κ
κ s
S
tP TAT
5.0ˆ
,            (14) 
where t(.) is the standard cumulative t distribution, and κ−TSˆ  the seat share prediction 
using data available κ quarters prior to the election, and sκ is the standard error of the 
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regression.  Where opinion poll data were not available we regressed the change in 
incumbent seat share against macroeconomic variables.  This allowed for the existing size 
of the majority to be taken into account.  We then summed the existing incumbent share 
and the predicted swing for the government to obtain a fitted seat share and derived 
probabilities as above. 
 
The second approach follows Cohen (1993).  Given that poll data follow a random walk 
(tested and not rejected by Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997)) the probabilities are 
derived directly and solely from the poll data: 


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
+
−
=
−−
− 1
50ˆ 1
κσ
.Q
ΦP κTB κT ,            (15) 
where Φ is the cumulative standard normal distribution and σ is the standard deviation of 
the random walk.  The poll data have been transformed (monotonically) into projected 
seat shares ( 1ˆ −−κTQ ) via a preferred Votes Into Seats function estimated by OLS from 
actual election results (see Maloney, Pearson and Pickering, 2001). 
 
The third probability series is proposed by CP and allows for variability in the date of the 
election.  This applies to most of the countries in the sample.  At a future date, j, the 
incumbent has a probability of winning ( ItjP ), given information known at time t 
modelled using either technique from above, and so this element can easily be estimated.  
There is also a probability distribution for whether or not the election will actually occur 
within that particular quarter ( EtjP ).  Following CP we estimate 
E
tjP  using a probit model 
                                                                                                                                                 
3 The macroeconomic data were output, inflation, unemployment, interest rates and first differences in all of 
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where the dependent variable is whether or not an election is called.  Given the increased 
constitutional diversity in our sample we augment the CP regressors (length of time since 
last election and the poll lead) with additional political explanatory variables to account 
for the cases of minority governments and a proxy for coalition stability.  Algebraically, 
the probability of the incumbent winning at a particular quarter, j, in the future is written 
as 
( )( ) ( ) ItjEtjEjtEttEttCtj PPPPPP 1,1,, 1...11 −+ −−−= .          (16) 
Fitted probability estimates for the sets of ItjP  and 
E
tjP  are substituted into (16) to derive 
the series for the probability of an election victory, given uncertain election dates.  EtjP  
comes from the probit model, and ItjP  is estimated from the best performing fixed 
election probability series ( ATP κ−  or 
B
TP κ− ) where the ‘best performer’ is the series, which 
gets the most predictions ‘right’ in the sense of being the right side of 50-50. 
 
Having computed the three probability series4, we can construct our Mt variable using 
equation (12), hence capturing the essence of electoral uncertainty.  The two dimensions 
of wage contract length (4, 6 or 8) and probability series chosen (types A, B or C) yield 
nine alternative series for Mt.  Pearson correlation coefficients between the series exceed 
0.90 in all cases: thus the alternative methods lead to measures that contain similar 
information. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
these.  The full output of these regressions is available on request (Maloney and Pickering, 2000a). 
4 Also available on request. 
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4. Is there a Rational Partisan Business Cycle? 
 
In this section we investigate whether the identity of the incumbent and the probability of 
its re-election affect output in the way that the RPBC theory suggests.  We test for the 
presence of rational partisan business cycles as described by our model (equation 13) on a 
country-by-country basis and within a panel5.  In the following section we test whether 
and what type of central bank independence reduces the RPBC. 
 
Our macroeconomic data come from the OECD database and cover 20 countries: 
Australia, Austria, Belgium Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.  The logged output data is 
passed through a Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter with the smoothing parameter set equal to 
1600 and so analysis focuses on deviations from the long-term trend, identified by the 
filter, that are potentially induced by rational partisan variables.  The series is multiplied 
by 100 to give percentage deviations from the long run trend.  As well as the regressors in 
(13) we employed dummy variables for the high oil price era (1973-1986) (DO) and for 
the 1990s recession (D90). 
 
There are nine (albeit highly correlated) alternative series of Mt and nineteen individual 
countries.  The Mt series generated by the probability measures proposed by Alesina, 
                                                 
5 Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997) who study RPBCs within 18 countries (our sample minus Greece and 
Spain) undertake comparative work for the period 1960-1993.  This work does not address the probability 
of the election result and uses partisan dummies (set equal to one for a right wing incumbent and equal to 
minus one for a left wing incumbent) to test for the RPBC.  Using a fixed effects model they find a 
significant RPBC in output. 
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Roubini and Cohen (1997 ch.5) (type B) in general gave less predictive power than the 
other two measures for all three contract lengths, although this is likely to be largely due 
to the smaller samples for which we had opinion poll data.  The evidence does not 
provide clear-cut support for one contract length over another, although given the way 
average explicit and implicit contract length varies from country to country this is to be 
expected.  We select particular Mt series on the basis of explanatory power, although the 
results are robust to alternative series. 
 
Estimation on a country by country basis yielded results that were by and large 
insignificant, and are thus not reported.  There are a number of possible explanations for 
this.  One is that there really is no rational partisan business cycle, although this 
contradicts the previous work by Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997) and Carlsen and 
Pedersen (1999).  Alternatively the large standard errors may be attributable to 
collinearity between Lt and Mt.  Suppose, for example, that it is 6 quarters before an 
election, and contracts last 8 quarters.  Then for 6/8 of the life of contracts now being 
signed, Mt will equal Lt.  Pearson correlation coefficients between Lt and Mt exceeded 0.8 
in almost all cases and so much of the information contained in one variable is contained 
in the other.  Consequently, lower levels of significance are to be expected compared with 
previous studies that only use one variable to capture PBC type effects. 
 
In order to overcome this problem the model is estimated using data pooled across 
countries.  This enables a much larger sample, and it also provides a platform to analyse 
the impact of central bank independence which varies substantially between countries but 
much less within countries across time.  A preliminary regression using the pooled data 
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found residuals that exhibited a considerable degree of serial correlation and the presence 
of ARCH.  To correct for the serial correlation we included additional lags of yt as 
regressors on the basis of statistical significance.  We then estimated the model using the 
maximum likelihood procedure of Engle (1982) following a correction for ARCH.  
Estimation initially employed fixed effects, but none of these were found to be significant 
and so the reported results exclude these variables. 
 
Table 1 Pooled estimation 
 Usable observations 3ˆ
b  
(std. error) 
{p-value} 
4ˆb  
(std. error) 
{p-value} 
Joint Test 
χ2 
{p-value}
Full Sample 3120 0.11 (0.02) 
{0.000} 
-0.18 
(0.03) 
{0.000} 
18.32 
{0.000} 
 
Reduced 
Sample 
2345 0.14 
(0.04 
{0.000} 
-0.15 
(0.04) 
{0.000} 
14.16 
{0.000} 
 
Table 1 shows that estimation of the full sample finds both political parameters correctly 
signed and significant at the 1% level; furthermore |b4| > b3 as predicted by the theory.  
The model is also estimated for a reduced sample of countries where the left-right 
distinction is arguably less ambiguous.  This reduced sample omits Belgium, Finland, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands and Switzerland and gives substantively the same 
results.  The joint hypothesis test, H0: 3ˆb  = 4ˆb  = 0, that both political variables do not 
influence the macroeconomic variable in question is rejected in both samples.  
Unfortunately the estimated intercept parameter, b0 was positive, although insignificant, 
and so it is difficult to obtain meaningful estimates of the structural parameters πR and πL 
using the method described at the end of section 2. 
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The findings reported in table 1 suggest that the magnitude of RPBC induced volatility is, 
on average, quite small.  Recall that the dependent variable is measured as percentage 
deviations in output from trend and thus fluctuates, in the main, between ± 2.00%.  The 
actual impact of the RPBC induced volatility depends on the parameter estimates b3 and 
b4, and also the value of the political variables Lt and Mt.  To gauge the magnitude of 
these effects we analyse four stylised cases.  Consider a right-wing incumbent who may 
win or lose and where either of these outcomes may be a complete surprise or completely 
expected.  (For a left-wing incumbent the analogous cases are mirror-images of what 
follows).  Taking our parameter estimates from the full sample and setting b1 = 0.86 the 
simulated path of yt is plotted in figure 1. 
Figure 1. Simulated Output Trajectories
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6 This assumes only one lag in the output process – 0.8 is the average estimated value for b1 from the 
individual regressions.  The results are robust to alternative representations of the dynamic process. 
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Larger Version of Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Simulated Output Trajectories
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In the case of the expected re-election (at time 0) of a right-wing incumbent, then there is 
no RPBC fluctuation.  If the re-election was a complete surprise, then output falls to 
0.18% below trend before recovering gradually.  Following a surprise left-wing victory 
the economy expands 0.2% above trend in the 2nd and 3rd quarter before reverting to 
trend.  In the case of a correctly predicted left-wing victory the volatility is less 
pronounced, with a small dip below trend prior to the election as wage setters adjust their 
expectations to below the existing incumbent’s policy.  Following this a minor post-
election expansion ensues as the new regime takes advantage of contracts agreed during 
the previous anti-inflationary era.  The RPBC effects generated are quite small, but 
significant, both statistically and economically.  The estimated coefficients may be 
interpreted as average measures and are likely to vary across countries, in which for 
instance central banks of varying degrees of independence conduct monetary policy. 
 
The RPBC theory suggests a number of testable hypotheses.  First, following an election 
output will in general be higher (lower) when a left (right) wing party is elected.  In 
common with previous studies we find this to be true; the presence of a Left-wing 
incumbent appears to have an expansionary effect on output.  Second, following an 
election this effect is stronger the more surprising that result; and third, before an 
election, the more expected an incumbent victory the smaller the fluctuation, the more 
expected an opposition victory the greater the fluctuation.  The second and third 
hypotheses are jointly tested by the reduced form parameter on Mt: they imply that b4 will 
be negative.  So it is: significantly.  This is an important new result and a refinement of 
the rational partisan political business cycle theory.  As a test of the theory, and also as an 
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important policy issue the focus now switches to the question of whether or not monetary 
policy constraints, and in particular independent central banks, can reduce the political 
volatility. 
 
5.  Do Independent Central Banks reduce the Rational Partisan Business Cycle? 
 
A government’s ability to run the economy in a partisan way depends on its ability to 
manipulate monetary policy.  Economists have looked long and hard at Central Bank 
Independence (CBI) as a restraint on damaging, politically determined macroeconomic 
policy7.  In this section we test whether increased CBI can reduce the RPBC-induced 
cycle identified in the previous section. 
 
We therefore augment the RPBC model in equation (13) with additional variables for 
central bank independence and ‘interaction terms’ where for example the degree of 
central bank independence influences the effect of political factors upon the macro 
variables. 
 
For our measures of CBI we use the Cukierman (1992) unweighted legal index (LVAU) 
and a new data set developed by Kilponen, Mayes and Vilmonen (2000) (KMV).  The 
LVAU index is the most widely known index and was recently updated8 by Schrijner and 
van Lelyveld (2000).  The KMV data set contains the component parts of the original 
                                                 
7 In a different setting Rogoff (1985) finds that delegation of policy to a credible independent central bank 
increases economic welfare.  Relevant empirical work includes that of Alesina (1988), Alesina and 
Summers (1993), Grilli et al (1991) and Cukierman (1992).  Hadri, Lockwood and Maloney (1998) test for 
the effects of central bank independence upon inflation and find some evidence in favour of the proposition 
that independent central banks limit political effects. 
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Cukierman index, defined as ‘Personnel Independence’ (PERI), ‘Policy Independence’ 
(POLI), ‘Objective Independence’ (OBJE) and ‘Financial Independence’ (FINI) and 
extends it throughout the 1990s.  These are individually constructed from updated 
responses to the Cukierman questionnaire9.  These specific measures of CBI are all in 
turn used in subsequent analysis in order to overcome one of the objections to measures 
of independence that the aggregated measures incorrectly weight variables.  A final index, 
which we denote as KMV is constructed as an unweighted average of PERI, POLI, OBJE 
and FINI.  All measures take values between 0 (no independence) and 1 (complete 
independence).   
 
Some have doubted whether CBI can ever be measured accurately (for example see 
Forder 1998), but we argue that whilst measurement has its problems, refusal to measure 
is much worse (Maloney and Pickering, 2000b).  Furthermore, our analysis uses several 
alternative measures and in doing this we can or at least try to establish which ‘types’ of 
CBI reduce the RPBC (or, if independence is thought to be ambiguous, simply which 
types of central bank). 
 
The monetary policy constraint augmented model for estimation is written as  
=ity  itttitititkit
k
ki CBIbDbDObMbLbbybbb 7654312
1
,100 90 ++++++++ −−
=
∑ π  
 tititititititititit uDFMbDFLbCBIMbCBILbDFb ++++++ 12111098 ,      (17) 
                                                                                                                                                 
8 Cukierman’s original index ends in 1992. 
9 See Appendix A in Cukierman (1992) for more details on the coding procedure, and Kilponen, Mayes and 
Vilmonen for details on their specific measures. 
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where the i subscript refers to individual countries, CBIit is the degree to which a central 
bank is independent and DFit is a dummy variable set equal to one when there is a fixed 
exchange rate10.  The country specific intercept terms, b0i capture the fixed effects.  There 
are k lags for output in order to capture dynamic effects and to reduce serial correlation.  
The CBI measure and the fixed exchange rate dummy are used as regressors in their own 
right.  There are four interaction terms, which are the products of the two political 
variables and the two monetary policy constraints.   
 
If the theory is correct, and if the measures of CBI are sufficiently accurate, then the 
estimated coefficients of these interaction terms ought to be the opposite sign of the 
estimated parameter of the relevant political variable.  That is, given b3 > 0 and b4 < 0 
then, if increasingly independent central banks and fixed exchange rates reduce these 
political effects, b9, b11 < 0, and b10, b12 > 0.  Equation (17) was estimated using 
maximum likelihood following a correction for fourth order ARCH using the alternative 
measures of Central Bank Independence, omitting Ireland for which the CBI data set was 
incomplete.  Table 2 presents the estimation results for the parameters corresponding to 
the political and institutional variables. 
 
                                                 
10 The Mundell-Fleming model suggests that monetary policy is ineffective under fixed exchange rates.  
However, it is possible that fiscal policy (particularly effective under fixed exchange rates) undermines the 
exchange rate regime as a constraint on partisan policy. 
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Table 2 Estimation of equation (17), full sample excepting Ireland 
 
Regression coefficients (standard errors) {p-values} Likelihood 
Function  
CBI 
Measure
b3 b4 b7 b8 b9 b10 b11 b12 Value 
LVAU 0.46 
(0.056) 
{0.000} 
-0.20 
(0.048) 
{0.000} 
0.33 
(0.065) 
{0.000}
-0.025 
(0.025) 
{0.324}
-0.97 
(0.17) 
{0.000} 
0.19 
(0.18) 
{0.299} 
-0.090 
(0.074) 
{0.227} 
0.004 
(0.09) 
{0.966} 
9895.35 
PERI 0.27 
(0.083) 
{0.001} 
-0.13 
(0.068) 
{0.05} 
0.12 
(0.09) 
{0.163}
-0.052 
(0.031) 
{0.095}
-0.41 
(0.16) 
{0.010} 
0.18 
(0.17) 
{0.290} 
0.006 
(0.09) 
{0.951} 
-0.07 
(0.11) 
{0.541} 
9885.15 
POLI 0.16 
(0.05) 
{0.002} 
-0.15 
(0.05) 
{0.002} 
0.26 
(0.13) 
{0.040}
-0.076 
(0.026) 
{0.4} 
-1.04 
(0.50) 
{0.039} 
1.33 
(0.58) 
{0.022} 
-0.007 
(0.08) 
{0.935} 
-0.05 
(0.10) 
{0.597} 
9887.94 
OBJE 0.40 
(0.042) 
{0.000} 
-0.24 
(0.042) 
{0.000} 
0.20 
(0.033) 
{0.000}
0.02 
(0.03) 
{0.356}
-0.56 
(0.097) 
{0.000} 
0.056 
(0.11) 
{0.604} 
-0.17 
(0.12) 
{0.181} 
-0.002 
(0.07) 
{0.968} 
9909.54 
FINI 0.24 
(0.05) 
{0.000} 
-0.14 
(0.054) 
{0.009} 
0.045 
(0.036) 
{0.216}
-0.028 
(0.030) 
{0.361}
-0.41 
(0.11) 
{0.000} 
0.26 
(0.13) 
{0.05} 
-0.055 
(0.084) 
{0.517} 
-0.056 
(0.10) 
{0.576} 
9890.93 
KMV 0.42 
(0.052) 
{0.000} 
-0.16 
(0.046) 
{0.000} 
0.30 
(0.066) 
{0.000}
-0.023 
(0.025) 
{0.365}
-0.91 
(0.16) 
{0.000} 
0.11 
(0.18) 
{0.514} 
-0.12 
(0.07) 
{0.109} 
0.004 
(0.09) 
{0.966} 
9900.45 
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Table 3 p-values of Joint Hypothesis Tests 
 
CBI 
Measure 
A B C D E F G 
LVAU 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.170 0.000 
PERI 0.032 0.017 0.013 0.078 0.005 0.556 0.037 
POLI 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.059 0.000 
OBJE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.025 0.000 
FINI 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.032 0.000 0.095 0.090 
KMV 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.161 0.000 
Hypothesis Tests 
A H0:b7 = b8 = b9 = b10 = b11 = b12 = 0  
B H0: b9 = b10 = b11 = b12 = 0 
C H0: b7 = b8 = b9 = b10 = 0 
D H0: b7 = b8 = b11 = b12 = 0 
E H0: b9 = b10 = 0 
F H0: b11 = b12 = 0 
G H0: b7 = b8 = 0 
 
The original political parameters (b3 and b4) retain their sign and increase their 
significance; both are significant at the 1% level for all CBI measures except personnel 
independence (PERI).  Hypothesis tests of joint significance reported in table 3 confirm 
this finding.  Furthermore, the magnitude of the estimates has increased in most cases, 
suggesting that RPBC volatility is stronger in countries without independent central 
banks.  Estimation using the reduced sample led to similar results. 
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A considerable result is that in every case the CBI interactive terms exhibit the ‘correct’ 
sign, offsetting the expansionary effects of a left wing incumbent and contracting effect of 
the Mt variable, and in many cases significantly.  The parameter estimate for b9 
(corresponding to the L-CBI interactive term) was negative and significant11 at the 5% 
level for all measures of CBI.  This provides significant evidence that independent central 
banks offset the expansionary tendency of left wing governments.  This effect was most 
pronounced in the cases of the two composite CBI terms, LVAU and KMV, and the 
objective independence measure (OBJE), although was present for all measures.  The 
evidence was less strong that independent central banks dampen the political effects as 
captured by the Mt variable, although b10 exhibits the correct sign in all cases.  In contrast, 
the exchange rate constraint was not found to mitigate any of the political effects. 
 
The likelihood function values supported the use of the objective independence measure.  
The composite measures, LVAU, and KMV also scored quite well, although this could be 
on account of their inclusion of the factors represented by objective independence.  
Personnel independence, policy independence and financial independence, whilst still 
individually apparently mitigating the PBC12, fare less successfully.  Objective 
independence might be expected to be the best measure of the effects of CBI, as the 
delegation type arguments rely upon Central Banks having precisely this characteristic.  
Ability to appoint your own board of governors, for example, is useless if inflation 
objectives are still set by politicians.  Instrument (policy) independence too may have 
                                                 
11 The estimated coefficients for b9 are often greater in magnitude than those for b3.  This does not mean 
that central banks over-compensate against the PBC effects because in most cases the CBI measures are 
substantially less than unity. 
12 That these measures reduce the PBC by themselves may be a spurious inference.  Increases in personnel, 
policy and financial independence tend to accompany increases in objective independence. 
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little stabilising effect if politicians have set the target inflation rate.  On the other hand, if 
the central bank is allowed to choose macroeconomic objectives, then there is a real 
potential for reduced political macroeconomic volatility. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
In this paper a model of rational partisan political business cycles was derived and 
estimated for 20 OECD democracies.  With a RPBC, output depends not just on who 
wins an election, but on how surprising its victory was – wage-setters’ political 
expectations will affect output both before and after the election.  The more inflation- 
averse the actual government, the lower the output after an election.  But the more 
inflation averse the expected government is, the higher the output on both sides of the 
election.  We estimate all these predicted effects and find all the relevant parameters 
significant and correctly signed.  We also find central bank independence significantly 
reduces each one of these effects.  The exact result depended on the exact measure of CBI 
– of which we tried out six.  As might have been expected, the measure of CBI that gave 
the best likelihood was that measure which captured objective independence. 
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Appendix: Estimating the Probabilities of Left- and Right-Wing Governments 
 
The most common political system, characterising 15 of our 20 countries, is one where 
two large parties, or coalitions of parties, alternate in office, with one party or coalition 
unambiguously to the left of the other.  Here successive governments are easy to classify 
as Left or Right.  Centre governments come about only when the two big players unite in 
a grand coalition (e.g. Germany from 1966-9).  Parties which have only held office as part 
of the left (right) coalition we classify as left (right).  Parties which have been part of both 
left-wing and right-wing coalitions we classify as centre.  Parties which have never been 
in office we classify as Centre unless there is evidence to the effect that they would 
contemplate joining one, but only one, of the major parties/blocs.  Thus, e.g. the UK 
Liberals (latterly Liberal Democrats) are counted as centre until after the 1992 election, at 
which point they made it clear that in a hung parliament they would not keep the 
Conservatives in power.  One rather paradoxical result of this is that parties so extreme 
that all other parties would shun or be shunned by them count as Centre!  But Centre, 
here, merely means neutral, for practical purposes, between the main Left and Right 
groupings.  We assume that voters in these countries always expect either a left or right 
government (i.e. centre governments are a complete surprise.)  The probability of a left 
(right) government is thus simply the probability that the parties classified left will have 
more (fewer) seats than those classified right.  When Centre governments do occur, we 
give the L dummy a value of 0.5. 
 
Of the five other countries, Belgium and the Netherlands have a large Centrist party, 
which spends all or most of the time in power, either by itself, or in coalition with a left- 
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or a right-wing party or grouping.  Each of the three remaining countries (Italy, Ireland 
and Switzerland) has, in our terms, an idiosyncratic political system.  For a full account of 
how we derive election probabilities in these five countries, see Maloney and Pickering 
(2000a). 
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